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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

that an American civilian would be subjected to a jurisdiction and
procedure completely unknown to him. Ignorance of this could deprive
the accused of a fair trial. Creation by Congress of foreign federal
courts is the third alternative. If treaties exist which create these jurisdictional vaccums, they would be directed to these courts and the Supreme Court has upheld Congress' power to so provide. 60
Regardless of the congressional decision, Reid has extended the Milligan
application to include this narrow field. Once again the Courts have protected the individuals' rights and their jurisdictional province from
congressional encroachment. All that need be said was said over one
hundred and fifty years ago:
In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall
never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them: the executive
shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them: the
judiciary shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of
them: to the end it may be a government of laws and not men. 61
60 Ex parte Bakelite, 279 U.S. 438 (1929); American Insurance v. 356 Bales of Cotton,
26 U.S. 511 (1828).
61
Mass. Const. Art. XXX.

LACHES IN ADMIRALTY ACTIONS
The length of time during which an action may be brought by a seaman for personal injury is governed by the admiralty doctrine of laches,
unlike ordinary common law actions which are generally strictly governed by statutes of limitations.' The seaman who is injured or becomes
ill in the service of the ship has three basic remedies against the owner
of the ship: (1) An action for maintenance and cure which will allow
him to recover his wages until the end of the voyage, his expenses for
lodging and medical expenses he has incurred for cure. (2) An action for
unseaworthiness should he be injured through the unseaworthiness of the
vessel. (3) An action under the Jones Act for negligence of the owner
of the vessel or his servants. 2 Laches is applied somewhat differently
1 Gardner v. Panama R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 29 (1951); Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S.

392 (1946); Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919); The Key City, 14
Wall. (U.S.) 653 (1871).
2
E.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903). Justice Brown stated that the law was
settled in these four propositions:

"1. That the vessel and her owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is
wounded, in the service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and
to his wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued.

"2. That the vessel and her owner are, both by English and American law, liable to
an indemnity for injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of
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as to each action. Unless an Act of Congress specifies a fixed time for
commencing an action or filing a petition or taking some other step in
an admiralty action, as was done in the case of the Jones Act actions, all
matters of delay are left to the discretion of the district court sitting in
admiralty. The exercise of this discretion has traced certain patterns dependent on the particular action involved.
One of the earliest pronouncements of the Supreme Court was embodied in The Key City 3 where a shipper of wheat brought an action
against the shipping company for the loss of the cargo some three and
one half years after it was lost. In ruling that admiralty actions are not
determined by state statutes of limitation the Court stated:
That while the courts of admiralty are not governed in such cases by any
statute of limitations, they adopt the principle that laches or delay in the judicial
enforcement of maritime liens will, under proper circumstances, constitute a
valid defence....
[N]o arbitrary or fixed period of time has been, or will be, established as
an inflexible rule, but that the delay which will defeat such a suit must in every
case depend on the peculiar equitable circumstances of that case.4
The Key City and The Osceola have proved to be touchstones for the
particular area of admiralty law decided in each. The doctrine of laches
though remaining substantially unchanged from the opinion rendered in
The Key City has undergone considerable refinement. All of the subsequent decisions, while adding refinements to the doctrine, have expressed
the two basic elements of the doctrine: inexcusable delay in the institution
of suit, and prejudice resulting to the defendant by reason of such delay. 5
the ship, or a failure to supply and keep in order the proper appliances appurtenant to

the ship.
"3. That all the members of the crew, except perhaps the master, are, as between
themselves, fellow servants, and hence seamen cannot recover for injuries sustained

through the negligence of another member of the crew beyond the expense of their
maintenance and cure.

"4. That the seaman is not allowed to recover an indemnity for the negligence of the
master, or any member of the crew, but is entitled to maintenance and cure, whether
the injuries were received by negligence or accident." Ibid., at 175. In 1920, Congress
enacted the Jones Act which provided a remedy for the seaman injured through
negligence of the master or any members of the crew. 46 U.S.C.A. S688 (Supp., 1959).
8 81 U.S. 653 (1871).
4 bid., at 660. "Upon the occurrence of certain mishaps or the non-fulfillment of
certain obligations arising out of contract or status, the maritime law gives to the

party aggrieved a right conceived of as a property interest in the tangible thing involved
(usually but not always a ship) in the (often as yet unascertained) amount of the ac-

crued liability. This right is called a maritime lien." Gilmore, The Law of Admirality,
32 (1957). Admirality law allows an action to be brought in personam, i.e., against the

person, in all three of the mentioned actions while an action in rem, i.e., against the

ship, may only be brought in the action for unseaworthiness and the action for main-

tenance and cure.
5
E.g., Loverich v. Warner, 118 F.2d 690 (C.C.A.3rd, 1941).
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The Supreme Court did not again speak on the subject of laches until
1951, when the Court made reference to the common practice of admiralty courts applying a state statute of limitations as a guide to a period
free of laches: 6
Though the existence of laches is a question primarily addressed to the
discretion of the trial court, the matter should not be determined merely by
a reference to and a mechanical application of the statute of limitations. The
equities of the parties must be considered as well. Where there has been no
inexcusable delay in seeking a remedy and where no prejudice to the defendant
has ensued from the mere passage of time, there should be no bar to relief.7
In the absence of special circumstances, admiralty courts follow the
practice of referring to a state action analogous to the particular admiralty action brought and applying the statute of limitations governing
that action to the admiralty action brought as a guide to what is and
what is not laches.8 The above quotation, of course, indicates accurately
that special circumstances are prevalent. In The Kermit9 sugar shipped
on the respondent's vessel arrived in a damaged state. Although the
libellant was fully aware of the damage at the time of arrival, his libel
was not filed until four and one half years after this occurrence. No
testimony was taken by the libellant until 1930, nine and one half years
after the cause of action accrued. The court, in holding the libellant's
action barred by laches, enumerated some of the circumstances to be
considered, before applying a state statute of limitations: The duration
of the delay in asserting the claim; the sufficiency of the excuse offered
in extenuation of the delay; the character of the evidence by which
plaintiff's right is sought to be established; whether during the delay the
evidence of the matters in dispute has been lost or become obscured or
the conditions have so changed as to render the enforcement of the
right inequitable; and whether third parties have acquired intervening
rights. The court added that the mere institution of a suit does not relieve
a person from the operation of the rule of laches; if he fails to prosecute
his suit diligently, the consequences are the same as though no suit had
been begun.
There are other situations, more numerous, where the surrounding
circumstances do not indicate laches so obviously. Where a libellant
pleads facts which on their face indicate that the analogous statute of
6 Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S. 29 (1951).
7 Ibid.,

at 30.

s Gardner v. Panama R. Co., 342 U.S. 29 (1951); Hughes v. Roosevelt, 107 F.2d 901

(C.C.A.2d, 1939); The Sydfold, 86 F.2d 611 (C.C.A.2d, 1936); Marshall v. International Mercantile Marine Co., 39 F.2d 551 (C.C.A.2d 1930); Redman v. United
States, 86 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y., 1948).

9 76 F.2d 363 (C.C.A.9th, 1935).
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limitations has run, he has the burden of rebutting a presumption that
the delay was inexcusable and prejudiced the defendant. 10 Thus, where
an action was brought against a scow company for damage to the
libellant's barge, and after three years, the respondent impleaded another
scow company as being the actual wrongdoer, the district court held
the action of impleader barred by laches. The court pointed out
that the applicable New York statute was three years, and since the
respondent had not rebutted the resulting presumption of laches, did not
allow his impleading action."
It should be noted that the presumption of laches is rebuttable and in
many cases this is accomplished. In The Gertrude1 2 the libellant performed in excess of one hundred hours work in raising and repairing the
respondent's sunken boat, and, when attempting to bring an action in
rem, was unable to locate the boat. The evidence indicated that the
owner had secreted its whereabouts. The court in refusing to allow the
defense of laches, stated that laches did not consist only of a time element
but diligence or the lack of it was always an important factor.
The nature of the action brought can also be of importance in enabling a libellant to rebut the presumption of laches. In Loverich v.
Warner13 a seaman developed a malignancy in his throat while working
for the respondent. He was discharged in 1933 and in 1939 brought
an action for maintenance and cure. The court, in disallowing the
defense of laches, accepted the libellant's argument to the effect that
because liability for maintenance and cure is absolute and because there
would be no necessity to find witnesses to establish negligence or unseaworthiness, the delay did not operate to the prejudice of the respondent. However, a frivolous excuse will not rebut the presumption of
laches. In Redman v. United States,14 an action brought four months
after the analogous state statute of limitations had run, the plea of the
libellant that he was not aware of the liability of the defendant was
rejected by the court which stated:
Ignorance of facts material to a claim may preclude the application of laches.
This, however, is not so when such ignorance is due to the negligent failure
of the libellant to make such inquiry as facts may reasonably suggest. 15
10 Hays v. Port of Seattle, 251 U.S. 233 (1920); Wilson v. Northwest Marine Iron
Works, 212 F.2d 510 (C.A.9th, 1954); Morales v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 208 F.2d
218 (C.A.Sth, 1955); Kane v. U.S.S.R., 189 F.2d 303 (C.A.3rd, 1951).

11 Dwyer Lighterage, Inc. v. Christie Scow Corp., 96 F. Supp. 900 (E.D.N.Y., 1951).
1238 F.2d 946 (C.C.A. 5th, 1930).
13 118 F.2d 690 (C.C.A.3rd, 1941).
14 86 F. Supp. 41 (S.D.N.Y., 1948).
15 Ibid., at 42.
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Where the applicable statute of limitations has not run, and as a result
the laches is not apparent on the face of the libel, the burden is on the
respondent to show that the delay was inexcusable or operated to his
prejudice.16 One of the most common arguments for an application of
laches is the unavailability of witnesses or the inability of witnesses who
are available to remember. Where the vessel sought to be attached has
been sold to an innocent purchaser without knowledge and the lien is
sought to be enforced against the ship in his hands, the delay tolerated
will be shorter and other circumstances will be given great weight, even
though the applicable statute of limitations has not yet run. 17
The defense of laches is as a rule properly presented only by answer
and not by exception unless the libel shows laches on its face.' 8 However,
the failure to plead laches in the answer as originally filed is not a waiver
of the defense. 19 The dismissal of a suit for laches is not a decree on the
merits. Thus where an action was brought for damage to a steamer and
the case was dismissed for laches, the respondent was not able to plead
res judicata in a subsequent suit against him in another district court, the
court indicating that a decree of laches will not bar a suit in another
20

court.

To this point it has been indicated that as a general rule, the admiralty
court will look to the analagous state statute and apply it as a guide to
proper period for laches. The analagous state statute will be the one which
limits an action as nearly the same to the particular admiralty action as
possible. Since the remedies allowed seamen for personal injuries are
peculiar to the law of admiralty a basic understanding of the individual
actions is necessary in order to understand the application of a particular
statute of limitations.
THE JONES ACT

The Jones Act action is unique in comparison to the other two actions
2
in that it is the only one of the three, created and governed by statute. '
The statute has incorporated by reference the Federal Employers Lia16Wilson v. Northwest Marine Iron Works, 212 F.2d 510 (C.A.9th, 1954); Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Harrison & Crossfield, 204 F.2d 366 (C.A.2d, 1953); Kane v.
U.S.S.R., 189 F.2d 303 (C.C.A.3rd, 1951); Redman v. United States, 176 F.2d 713 (C.A.2d,
1949); United States v. Dussel Iron Works, 31 F.2d 535 (C.A.Sth, 1929).
1T The Key City, 81 U.S. 653 (1871); Phelps v. The Cecilia Ann, 199 F.2d 627
(C.A.4th, 1952).
18 Pacific Atlantic S.S. Co. v. The Tower Grange, 80 F. Supp. 461 (D.C. Md., 1948);
Sprague &Son Co. v. Howard, 68 F. Supp. 348 (D.C.N.J., 1946).
19 Redman v. United States, 176 F.2d 713 (C.A.2d, 1949).
20
Warner v. Buffalo Drydock, 67 F.2d 540 (C.C.A.2d, 1933). See The Sydfold, 86
F.2d 611 (C.C.A. 2d, 1936).
2146 U.S.C.A. S 688 (Supp., 1959).
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bility Act which provided originally for a two year statute of limitations
22
and has been amended to provide for a three year statute of limitations.
Because the statute specifically states the limitation period, this period
controls, and laches is inapplicable. The Jones Act period of limitations
has been consistently held to control over the various state statutes of
limitation. In an action by a seaman under the Jones Act for personal
injuries, in ruling that the three year period allowed for commencement
of suits under the Jones Act superseded the one year allowed by the
California statute for similar actions, the court said:
We conclude that the provision of §6 of the Employers Liability Act relating
to the time of commencing the action is a material provision of the statutes
modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal
injury to railway employees which was adopted by and incorporated in the
Merchant Marine Act. And, as a provision affecting the substantive right created
by Congress in the exercise of its paramount authority in reference to the
maritime law, it must control in an action brought in a state court under 23the
Merchant Marine Act, regardless of any statute of limitations of the state.
MAINTENANCE AND CURE

Any member of the crew of a vessel may recover for any expenses
for injuries incurred by him during the period of his employment. 24 Fault
on the part of the owner or his servants is not necessary to the action 25 and
the only generally recognized defense to the action is that the seaman
was injured as a result of his own wilful misconduct. 26 Under the
maintenance and cure action, the seaman may recover in three areas: (1)
For medical expenses until that point of maximum cure is reached; 27 (2)
for expenses of lodging; 28 and (3) for his wages during the period of
29
the voyage.
22 Ibid. For further information on the Jones Act, consult 9 De Paul Law Review
51 (1959).
23Bogdanovitch v. Gasper, 41 F. Supp. 457, 460 (S.D.Cal., 1941). See Arnson v.
Murphy, 109 U.S. 238 (1883).

*

24 E.g;,

The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938).

25 E.g., Calmar

26 The Coniscliff, 270 Fed. 206 (C.C.A.5th, 1921); Cornell S.S. Co. v. Fallow, 179

Fed. 293 (C.C.A.2d, 1909). The courts are not inclined to find wilful misconduct too
easily and have not found it even in cases where the injuries resulted from the
libellant's own drunkenness. Bentley v. Albatross S.S. Co., 203 F.2d 270 (C.A.3rd, 1953).
27 Stanovich v. Julin, 227 F.2d 245 (C.A.9th, 1955); Sims v. War Shipping Administration, 186 F.2d 972 (C.A.3rd, 1951).
* 2sKoslusky v. United States, 208 F.2d 957 (C.A.3rd, 1953); Robinson v. isbrandtsen
Co., 203 F.2d 514 (C.A.2d, 1953).
29 Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949); Jones v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 130
F.2d 797 (C.C.A.3rd, 1942), aff'd 318 U.S. 724 (1943); Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Lucas,

264 Fed. 938 (C.C.A.9th, 1920); The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. 390 (S.D. N.Y, 1883).
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Keeping in mind that the nature of the action is the determinative
factor in the decision of what state statute of limitations is applicable for
laches, perhaps the best insight into the nature of the action may be
gained by a view of the development of the action. The origins of the
action are traced by most writers to various medieval codes which at that

time comprised the law of admiralty. 30 The earliest mention of the
doctrine in American law was in two early cases, Harden v. Gordon3'
and Reed v. Canfield32 which, together with the well known decision
in The Osceola,33 became foundation cases for the maintenance and cure
action.
In discussing jurisdiction over maintenance and cure actions the court
in Harden stated:
Supposing that by the principles of law the seamen are entitled, in case of
sickness, to be healed at the expense of the ship, I am of the opinion, that the
claim for such expense may be enforced in the court of admiralty. It constitutes,
in contemplation of law, a part of the contract for wages, and is a material
34
ingredient in the compensation for the labor and services of the seaman.
The court in Reed allowed the same recovery for expenses so far ".

..

as

expenses are incurred in the cure, whether they are of a medical or other
nature, for diet, lodging, nursing, or other assistance," 33 but pointed out
that there was no recovery for permanent injuries. This case was decided
before actions for unseaworthiness or under the Jones Act were recognized. It is noteworthy that Harden, beyond defining the action of maintenance and cure, gave the action a contractual nature by describing
the seaman's rights as part of the contract for wages. This nature has
remained with the action and the Harden opinion to that effect reflects
by and large the attitude of more recent decisions.3 6
Several decisions have spoken of the right of maintenance and cure as
one created by admiralty law and given to the seaman where the relationship of owner and seaman exists.37 This is significant in that the same
30

Laws of Oleron, Art. VI, Art. VII (1190); Laws of Wisbuy, Art. XVIII, Art.
XIX; Laws of the Hanse Towns, Art. XXXIX, Art. XLV; Marine Ordinances of
Louis, Art. XIV.
3' 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (D.Me., 1823).
32 20 Fed. Cas. 426 (D.Mass., 1832).
83189 U.S. 158 (1903).
34 Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480, 481 (1823).
83
5 Reed v. Canfield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426, 429 (1832).
36 Aguilar v. Standard Oil, 318 U.S. 724 (1943); Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287
U.S. 367 (1932); Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930); Pacific S.S. Co. v.
Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928); Western Fuel Co.v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921).
87 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932); Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peterson,
278 U.S. 130 (1928); Sims v. War Shipping Administration, 186 F.2d 972 (CA.3rd,
1951); Muise v. Abbott, 160 F.2d 590 (C.C.A.lst, 1947).
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remarks have been made regarding the action of unseaworthiness of
which more will be said in the discussion of that action.
No cases have been found which consider the action of maintenance
and cure as a delictual one for purposes of applying state statutes of
limitation. On the basis of this case law, the admiralty courts have consistently applied the particular state contractual statute of limitations
as opposed to the delictual statute, where one was to be applied as a
guide for laches.38
UNSEAWORTHINESS

The doctrine of unseaworthiness has had a rather checkered career
in the admiralty courts. At one time the doctrine was limited to providing remedies only in situations where the owner was at fault in some
way. 39 Gradually, the doctrine became such that liability for all damages
proximately resulting from any breach of the implied warranty of seaworthiness is imposed by law upon the owner regardless of whether or
not the unseaworthy condition aboard the vessel or the vessel itself hap40
pens to be within the control of the owner.
From the standpoint of impact upon the law of unseaworthiness, one
of the most important cases of this century was Seas Shipping Co. v.
Sieracki.41 Sieracki, a longshoreman, was employed by a stevedoring
company to load cargo on the S.S. Robin Sherwood. He was operating
a winch lowering cargo into a hold when part of the equipment broke,
resulting in injury to him. In describing the duty on the part of the vessel
owner to provide a seaworthy ship, the Court said:
It is essentially a species of liability without fault, analogous to other well
known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped to meet the hazards

which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by con-

form of absolute duty
ceptions of negligence nor contractual in character. It is a 42
the range of its humanitarian policy.

owing to all within

Perhaps the most oft quoted statement on the source of the action of
unseaworthiness is from the Sieracki decision wherein the court stated:
38 Loverich v. Warner, 118 F.2d 690 (C.C.A.3rd, 1941); Marshall v. International
Mercantile Marine Co., 39 F.2d 551 (C.C.A.2d, 1930); McGrath v. Panama Railway
Co., 298 Fed. 303 (C.C.A.5th, 1924); Benjamin v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 948

(S.D.N.Y., 1949); Frame v. New York, 34 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y., 1940); Cresci v.
Standard Fisheries, 7 F.2d 378 (S.D. Cal., 1925).
3
9 The Tawnie, 80 F.2d 792 (C.C.A.5th, 1936); The Cricket, 71 F.2d 60 (C.C.A. 9th,
1934); Burton v. Greig, 271 Fed. 271 (C.C.A. 5th, 1921); Kahyis v. Arundel, 3 F. Supp.
492 (D. Md., 1933).
40 Grille v. United States, 232 F.2d 919 (C.A.2d, 1956); Rogers v. United States Lines,
205 F.2d 57 (C.A.3rd, 1953); Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (C.A.9th, 1953).
41 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
42 Ibid.,

at 94, 95.
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"The origins are perhaps unascertainable.114 Concededly, the origins do
not appear to be at all definite. The action seems to be derived from the
44
seaman's privilege to abandon a ship improperly fitted out.
In England in 1896, a statute was enacted providing that there should
be imported into every contract of service between the owner of the
vessel and the seamen on board an implied obligation, "that the owner
of the ship, and the master, and every agent charged with the loading of
the ship, or the preparing thereof for sea, or the sending thereof to sea,
shall use all reasonable means to insure the seaworthiness of the ship for
the voyage at the time when the voyage commences, and to keep her in
a seaworthy condition for the voyage during the same."'45 It is not easily
determined whether this statute was evoked by American law, or influenced our law, or was merely coincidental with our law. It is noteworthy, however, because of the contractual treatment of the action by
the English law. The statute was noted in The Osceola where the court
commented on it and resulting decisions implementing the right of seamen
in England to an indemnity for breach of the warranty of seaworthiness.
The court also noted the same liability had been recognized in the
United States as a result of a consensus among the circuit and district
courts that the obligation of the owner to furnish a seaworthy ship
should be recognized. One court explained their recognition of the new
liability by reason of the fact that, in the early days of shipping, every
seaman could judge for himself whether all the equipment on board was
seaworthy since he was familiar with it, whereas with the advent of
mechanization in shipping, the seaman could not rely on his own knowledge to judge the seaworthiness of the equipment and therefore had to
46
rely on the owner.
In many of the unseaworthiness cases decided before The Osceola, the
right of the seamen to recover for unseaworthiness necessitated proof of
the negligent failure of the owner of the vessel or his servants to provide
a seaworthy ship. 47 These cases leaned toward the ordinary tort action,
with negligence as a necessary factor to be proved.
However, the Sieracki decision reversed any trend that might have been
starting in that direction. Since Sieracki was a longshoreman, another issue which arose and was answered was the question to whom did the war48 Ibid., at 91.
44 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944); Dixon v. The Cypress, 7 Fed.
Cas. 755 (D. Pa., 1789).

45 Merchant Shipping Acts, 39 to 40 Vict., Ch. 80, S5 (1876).
46 The Edith
Godden, 23 Fed. 43 (S.D. N.Y., 1885).
47 Rainey v. Grace & Co., 216 Fed. 449 (C.C.A. 9th, 1914), cert. den. 235 U.S. 704
(1914); Hamilton v. United States, 268 Fed. 15 (C.C.A. 4th, 1920); Rainey v. New York
& P. S.S. Co., 216 Fed. 449 (C.C.A. 9th, 1914).
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ranty of seaworthiness extend? As there was no privity of contract between Sieracki and the owner of the vessel, the court, in order to find
liability, had to go beyond the theory that had been subscribed to by
most of the courts prior to that time which was that the duty to furnish a
seaworthy ship was an implied part of the contract between owner and
seaman. 48 Thus Sieracki rejected as a sole basis for liability both contract
and negligence and established a liability without fault on the part of the
owner for any breach of the warranty of seaworthiness.
After rejecting negligence as the sole source of the unseaworthiness
action entirely and contract to the extent that it was the sole source, the
court explained:
It is only the source of the relation which furnishes the occasion for the
liability, attached by law to performance of the service, to come into play. Not
the owner's consent to
liability, but his consent to performance of the service
49
defines its boundary.
It is significant that the court was speaking of the unseaworthiness action
as a right imposed by the admiralty law on the relationship of owner and
seamen. Several decisions indicated similar thinking regarding the maintenance and cure action. However, the courts have not applied a contractual statute of limitations as with the maintenance and cure action but
rather, in unseaworthiness, have generally applied a tort statute in determining the period for laches. 50
An interesting development has occurred in the Second Circuit where,
despite a recent case clearly deciding the unseaworthiness action to be
delictual, 51 the Court of Appeals, in Le Gate v. The Panamolga,5 2 applied
a contractual statute of limitations to an unseaworthiness action. The
court noted that since in a common law action 53 for breach of warranty
of fitness where the plaintiff was burned because of his clothes catching
fire, the New York Court.of Appeals had applied a contractual statute of
limitations deeming it appropriate in view of absence of necessity to prove
fault. On this basis, the court reasoned that the action of unseaworthiness
48

Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955); Rogers v. United States Lines,
205 F.2d 57 (C.A.3d, 1953); Petterson v. Alaska S.S. Co., 205 F.2d 478 (C.A.9th, 1953);
Read v. United States, 201 F.2d 758 (C.A.3rd, 1953).
49
Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 96 (1946).
50 Wilson v. Northwest Marine Iron Works, 212 F.2d 510 (C.A.9th, 1954); Kane v.
U.S.S.R., 189 F.2d 303 (CA.3rd, 1951); Redman v. United Fruit Co., 185 F.2d 553
(C.A.2d, 1950); Redman v. United States, 176 F.2d 713 (C.A.2d, 1949); White v. American Barge Lines, 127 F. Supp. 637 (W.D. Pa., 1955).
51 Strika v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, 185 F.2d 555 (C.A.2d, 1950).
52 221 F.2d 689 (C.A.2d, 1955). LeGate was reaffirmed in Tesoriero v. The Molda,
232 F.2d 311 (C.A.2d, 1956).
5

8 Blessington

v. McCrory Stores, 305 N.Y. 140, 111 N.E.2d 421 (1953).
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should also have the contractual statute of limitations applied because no
fault need be proved there either. This application of the contractual
statute of limitations was repeated for the same reasons by a Pennsylvania
54
district court.
The Le Gate case did not decide that the unseaworthiness action was
of a contractual nature thus departing from the Sieracki decision, but
rather that the contractual statute of limitations was better suited to the
action of unseaworthiness than the delictual statute. This could well prove
to be something of a compromise answer to the question of whether the
unseaworthiness has a delictual or contractual nature or perhaps neither
as maintained by Sieracki.
In conclusion, the doctrine of laches determines how long a libellant
may wait to bring his action in admiralty. In the absence of a statutory
provision setting out this time as in the Jones Act, or special circumstances
contracting or expanding the period during which an action may be
brought without prejudicing the respondent, the applicable state statute
of limitations is used as a guide to the proper period. The contractual
statute is consistently used in maintenance and cure actions. The majority
of courts apply a delictual statute in actions for unseaworthiness but a
possible trend, originated by the second circuit, towards applying a contractual statute is discernible.
54 Cummings v. Redeeriakteeb Transatlantic, 144 F. Supp. 422 (E.D. Pa., 1956), aff'd.
242 F.2d 275 (C.A.3rd, 1957).

DEVELOPMENT OF RIGHTS AGAINST NEGLIGENT
THIRD PARTIES UNDER THE ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
The Workmen's Compensation Act when introduced was a revolutionary development in the solution to the problem of industrial accidents.
From the date of its mental conception to the time of its legal inception
this legislation has given rise to repeated queries from the members of the
Illinois Bar. In April of 1911, John H. Wigmore assailed the adoption of
this legislation in Illinois at that time. In discussing its complexities and
lack of national uniformity he said: "The danger is-yes, the certainty is
-that confusion will be 'worse confounded' if these bills pass now."'
Although fifty years have passed, many provisions of this legislation
still appear to be in a state of legal confusion. This article will be limited
to just one of these areas of confusion-third party liabilities. The discussion is made in the hope that a disentanglement of past judicial decisions
will lead to a clearer understanding and appreciation of the 1959 Illinois
Workmen's Compensation Act.

15 11.

L. Rev. 571 (1911).

